Organon F

Volume 30, November 2023, Issue 4, Pages 339–349

ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)

I identify an inconsistency in Jago’s theory of truth. I show that Jago is committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A. I show that Jago is committed to the proposition that A being true because A if the proposition that A is true. I show that these two commitments, given the rest of Jago’s theory, entail a contradiction. I show that while the latter commitment follows from Jago’s theory of truth, even by Jago’s own lights he should not be committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A.

Truth; truthmaking; proposition; state of affairs; explanation; redundancy.

Author

Nathan William Davies

Address

Kenilworth, United Kingdom

E-mail

nwd.correspondence@gmail.com 

Received

31 July 2023

Revised

30 November 2023

Accepted

4 December 2023

Publishers

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

APA

Davies, N.W. (2023). Removing an Inconsistency from Jago’s Theory of Truth. Organon F, 30(4), 339–349. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30403

Chicago

Davies, Nathan William. 2023. "Removing an Inconsistency from Jago’s Theory of Truth." Organon F 30 (4): 339–349. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30403

Harvard

Davies, N.W. (2023). Removing an Inconsistency from Jago’s Theory of Truth. Organon F, 30(4), pp. 339–349. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30403

© Nathan William Davies

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