Organon F
Volume 29, August 2022, Issue 3, Pages 376–388
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
Research Article
Concepts May Still Be Objects
Harold Noonan
https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304
In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chapter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says, it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted.
Concept; objet; Wright; singular term; predicate; Frege.
Author
Harold Noonan
Affiliation
University of Nottingham
Address
University of Nottingham, Department of Philosophy, Room C41 Humanities, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, United Kingdom
Harold.Noonan@nottingham.ac.uk
Received
11 May 2022
Revised
20 August 2022
Accepted
28 August 2022
Published online
24 September 2022
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Noonan, H. (2022). Concepts May Still Be Objects. Organon F, 29(3), 376–388. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304
Chicago
Noonan, Harold. 2022. "Concepts May Still Be Objects." Organon F 29 (3): 376–388. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304
Harvard
Noonan, H. (2022). Concepts May Still Be Objects. Organon F, 29(3), pp. 376–388. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304
© Harold Noonan
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