Organon F
Volume 28, August 2021, Issue 3, Pages 557–580
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
Research Article | Special issue on Value in Language
Faultless Disagreement Contextualism
Alex Davies
https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28304
It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.
Disagreement; faultless disagreement; instrumental reasons; objectivity.
Author
Affiliation
University of Tartu
Address
University of Tartu, Ülikooli 18, 50090 Tartu, Estonia
alexander.stewart.davies@ut.ee
Received
1 December 2020
Accepted
11 May 2021
Published online
30 August 2021
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Davies, A. (2021). Faultless Disagreement Contextualism. Organon F, 28(3), 557–580. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28304
Chicago
Davies, Alex. 2021. "Faultless Disagreement Contextualism." Organon F 28 (3): 557–580. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28304
Harvard
Davies, A. (2021). Faultless Disagreement Contextualism. Organon F, 28(3), pp. 557–580. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28304
© Alex Davies
https://www.sav.sk/?lang=sk&doc=journal-list&part=article_response_page&journal_article_no=26504
The above URL is linked with the article's response page. The response page is a permanent location that is associated with the article's DOI number.
This article is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0).