Organon F
Volume 27, November 2020, Issue 4, Pages 539–555
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
Research Article
Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues
Andrei Ionuţ Mărăşoiu
https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408
I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.
Experience; expertise; fluency; intellectual virtue; moral virtue; necessitation; normativity; rationality; reflection.
Author
Andrei Ionuţ Mărăşoiu
Affiliation
Institutul de Cercetare al Universității din București (ICUB)
Address
Str. Dr. Dimitrie Brândză nr. 1, Bucureşti, România 060102
andrei.marasoiu@icub.unibuc.ro
Received
28 October 2019
Accepted
3 August 2020
Published online
27 October 2020
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Mărăşoiu, A.I. (2020). Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues. Organon F, 27(4), 539–555. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408
Chicago
Mărăşoiu, Andrei Ionuţ. 2020. "Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues." Organon F 27 (4): 539–555. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408
Harvard
Mărăşoiu, A.I. (2020). Defending the Good Dog Picture of Virtues. Organon F, 27(4), pp. 539–555. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408
© Andrei Ionuţ Mărăşoiu
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