Organon F

Volume 27, November 2020, Issue 4, Pages 494–503

ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)

I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper's proposed solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.

Conjecture; falsification; induction; Karl Popper; pragmatic problem of induction; rational action.

Author

Danny Frederick

Affiliation

–

Address

13 Sandhurst Road, Yeovil, Somerset, BA20 2LG, United Kingdom

E-mail

dannyfrederick77@gmail.com

Received

1 October 2019

Accepted

4 August 2020

Published online

17 October 2020

Publishers

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

APA

Frederick, D. (2020). Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction. Organon F, 27(4), 494–503. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27405

Chicago

Frederick, Danny. 2020. "Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction." Organon F 27 (4): 494–503. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27405

Harvard

Frederick, D.  (2020). Falsificationism and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction. Organon F, 27(4), pp. 494–503. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27405

© Danny Frederick

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