Organon F

Volume 27, November 2020, Issue 4, Pages 437–445

ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)

The aim of this paper is to document Laudan’s rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire approach to the evaluation of a theory of method. This is an important stage in the development of his normative naturalist meta-methodology.

Epistemic normativity; meta-methodology; method; theory-change.

Author

Howard Sankey

Affiliation

University of Melbourne

Address

School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia 3010

E-mail

chs@unimelb.edu.au

Received

6 February 2020

Accepted

3 June 2020

Published online

16 June 2020

Publishers

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

APA

Sankey, H. (2020). Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism. Organon F, 27(4), 437–445. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402

Chicago

Sankey, Howard. 2020. "Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism." Organon F 27 (4): 437–445. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402

Harvard

Sankey, H.  (2020). Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism. Organon F, 27(4), pp. 437–445. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402

© Howard Sankey

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