Organon F

Volume 27, May 2020, Issue 2, Pages 263–279

ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)

On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed in this norm is a moral value. I accept a deflationary theory of truth, according to which truth is too thin a concept to be constituted by any substantial norms. Thus I agree that the concept of truth is not constitutively normative. In this paper, however, I argue that the alleged value of true beliefs can be better explained in terms of epistemic normativity rather than moral normativity.

Horwich; deflationism about truth; the value of truth; moral values; epistemic values.

Author

Byeong D. Lee

Affiliation

Sungkyunkwan University

Address

Department of Philosophy, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea

E-mail

bydlee@skku.edu 

Received

9 February 2019

Accepted

3 December 2019

Published online

13 December 2019

Publishers

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

APA

Lee, Byeong D. (2020). Horwich on the Value of Truth. Organon F, 27(2), 263–279. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204

Chicago

Lee, Byeong D. 2020. "Horwich on the Value of Truth." Organon F 27 (2): 263–279. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204

Harvard

Lee, Byeong D. (2020). Horwich on the Value of Truth. Organon F, 27(2), pp. 263–279. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204

© Byeong D. Lee

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