Organon F
2021, Pages 1–21
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
In “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892) Frege raises a problem concerning identity statements of the form a=b and he criticizes the view he holds in the Begriffsschrift (1879, § 8). In building on a suggestion by Perry (2001/12, ch. 7) I will show how Frege’s Begriffsschrift account can be rescued and how Frege’s 1892 criticism of his Begriffsschrift’s position somewhat miss the point. Furthermore, the Begriffsschrift’s view can be developed to account in quite an elegant way to the so-called Frege’s Puzzle without committing to the sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction Frege introduces in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. To do so we have, though, to give up the idea that all the relevant information conveyed by the utterance of a simple sentence is encapsulated into a single content. I will show of this can be done in adopting a Perry-style pluri-propositionalist model of communication.
Frege; Perry, identity co-reference.
Author
Eros Corazza
Affiliation
The University of the Basque Country. Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science. Carleton University
Address
The University of the Basque Country UPV-EHU, Donostia, Spain
Received
1 September 2020
Revised
26 October 2020
Accepted
28 December 2020
Published online
19 March 2021
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
Corazza, Eros. "Frege on Identity and Co-Reference" Organon F 2021, 1–21. https://www.organonf.com/journal/corazza/
© Eros Corazza
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